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ESCAPING  THE    
MALTHUSIAN  TRAP  
DYNASTY  TRUSTS  FOR  SERIOUS  DYNASTS  
John V. Orth† 
HE CENTURIES-LONG HISTORY of Anglo-American proper-
ty law can be told as a struggle between the dynastic im-
pulse that seeks to tie up a family’s property forever and 
the public policy of providing an opportunity for the tal-
ented and ambitious to acquire property (and eventually found their 
own dynasties). From the beginning, an estate in fee simple was in-
heritable – as indicated by the formula “to A and his heirs” – but 
when it also became alienable, the risk emerged that one unwise 
descendant could bring the dynasty to an abrupt end.1 The effort to 
limit descent to the “heirs of the body” seemed to offer a solution, 
turning the fee simple into a series of life estates in successive de-
scendants. But English judges defeated this attempt by construing 
                                                                                                 
† John Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina 
School of Law. His previous series of articles written for the Green Bag, “Reappraisals in the 
Law of Property,” is available in book form from Ashgate Publishing (2010). 
1 See 2 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law 
13 (2d ed. 1898) (Beginning early in the thirteenth century, “[t]he tenant in fee 
[simple] could alienate the land away from his heir. This having been decided, it 
became plain that the words ‘and his heirs’ did not give the heir any rights . . . .”). 
T 
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the resulting estate as a fee simple conditional, which could be alien-
ated after the birth of issue.2 The dynasts’ response in 1285 was the 
statute De Donis Conditionalibus, requiring the judges to read the 
grant as written (that is, as creating a fee tail).3 
In due course, royal judges permitted the entail to be “barred” 
(or broken) by an ingenious series of legal fictions, allowing the ten-
ant in tail to convey a fee simple.4 Undeterred, elite lawyers tried 
one expedient after another until eventually a compromise was 
reached between the dynastic impulse and public policy. The Rule 
Against Perpetuities – which would more accurately be called “the 
rule against remote vesting” – limited the reach of the dead hand to 
the next generation or two.5 For centuries, this compromise held, 
until a renewed dynastic initiative, spurred by a change in federal 
tax law in 1986,6 took advantage of dissatisfaction with the com-
plexities and absurdities of the Rule Against Perpetuities and engi-
neered its modification or outright repeal.7 The dynasty trust, dis-
                                                                                                 
2 See Sheldon F. Kurtz, Moynihan’s Introduction to the Law of Real Property § 5, p. 50 
(5th ed. 2011). 
3 13 Edw. I, c. 1 (1285). 
4 See Taltaram’s Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, Mich. 25 (1472). For a description of the 
common recovery, the usual means of barring the entail, see John V. Orth, Does 
the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 775-76 (1988). 
See also John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10 Law 
& Hist. Rev. 33 (1992). 
5 The Rule Against Perpetuities, as we know it, can be traced to the Duke of 
Norfolk’s Case, 3 Ch. Ca. 29, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682). It reached its classic 
formulation in the treatise on the subject by Professor John Chipman Gray, first 
published in 1886: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 
21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” John Chipman 
Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 201, p. 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
6 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, provided a generous 
exemption from the generation-skipping-transfer tax, originally $1 million, but 
regularly increased. Estate planners quickly recognized the long-term tax ad-
vantages that would result from placing the exempted amount in a perpetual trust 
and distributing only the income it produced. See Jesse Dukeminier et al., Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates 909 (8th ed. 2009). 
7 Support for the common law Rule Against Perpetuities had been steadily eroded 
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tributing income “to my descendants alive from time to time forever” 
– “a sort of throwback to entail”8 – is now a reality in many states.9 
!" 
odern concerns about the consequences of allowing dynasty 
trusts are eerily reminiscent of the concerns expressed over 
two centuries ago about the fee tail. When the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly abolished entailment in 1784, for example, it ex-
plained that “entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and im-
portance of particular families and individuals, giving them an une-
qual and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold in-
stances the source of great contention and injustice.”10 If they func-
tion as planned, dynasty trusts will have the same effect, creating an 
hereditary class of wealthy individuals. But modern critics of dynas-
ty trusts have consoled themselves with the thought that the costs of 
administration, inflation, rising expectations, and (above all) “an 
ever growing army of surviving descendants of the settlor and their 
dependents” will ultimately defeat the dynastic impulse.11 
                                                                                                 
by what Professor W. Barton Leach called “argumentative jargon” – memorable 
labels, such as “the unborn widow” and “the fertile octogenarian,” intended to 
highlight the absurdity of some of the extreme applications of the Rule. See W. 
Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 973, 991 n. 78 
(1965). See also John V. Orth, Labels: Argumentative Jargon, in John V. Orth, Reap-
praisals in the Law of Property 117 (2010). 
8 Adam Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 Oxford International Encyclopedia of 
Legal History 235, 239 (2009). 
9 For a list of states that had repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities as of 2009, see 
Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 909. 
10 Act of 1784, ch. 204, § 5. The first North Carolina Constitution, in a provision 
still in effect (and replicated in other state constitutions), decried perpetuities as 
“contrary to the genius of a free state.” N.C. Const. of 1776, Decl. of Rts. § 22; 
N.C. Const. Art. I, § 34. See John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities in North Carolina, 
31 Campbell L. Rev. 399 (2009). Notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently upheld the constitutionality of legis-
lation allowing perpetual trusts. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 688 
S.E.2d 752 (N.C. App. 2010). 
11 William J. Turnier & Jeffrey Harrison, A Malthusian Analysis of the So-Called Dynas-
M 
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The prediction that people can multiply faster than resources can 
grow is associated with a pessimistic eighteenth-century English-
man, the Rev. Thomas Malthus.12 Summed up in the classic formula 
that population increases geometrically while agricultural produc-
tion increases only arithmetically,13 Malthusianism doomed humani-
ty to periodic famines in order to bring people and their food supply 
into balance. As applied to the dynasty trust, the Malthusian trap 
would seem inevitably to frustrate the settlor’s purpose, as the 
number of beneficiaries outpaces the growth in trust income, even-
tually reducing distributions to trivial amounts.14 In fact, humanity 
has so far escaped the Malthusian effect by using improved methods 
of agriculture that increase yield and restrictive reproductive practic-
es that limit population growth. Similarly, dynasty trusts may escape 
the Malthusian trap if pursued with sufficient skill and resolution. 
Serious dynasts – or, to be more precise, their legal advisors – 
have long recognized the threat posed by excessive demands on dy-
nastic property. No one who has read the classics of English litera-
ture (or watched the popular television series Downton Abbey15) 
can fail to recognize the traditional solution: primogeniture, limiting 
the estate to one taker in each generation, typically the first-born 
                                                                                                 
ty Trust, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 779, 784 (2009). See also Jesse Dukeminier & James E. 
Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1339 (2003) (“Mul-
tiplication of beneficiaries is not such a bad thing . . . . It tends to dilute the con-
centration of wealth . . . .”). 
12 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principles of Population (1st ed. 1798; reprinted 
1970). 
13 Id. at 71 (“Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsist-
ence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.”). 
14 For a sophisticated economic analysis, see generally Turnier & Harrison, Malthusi-
an Analysis, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 779. For an extreme example of the effect of division 
of an inherited asset among all descendants in each generation, see Hodel v. Ir-
ving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (discussing the fractionation of Native American al-
lotments over a century) (“The average tract has 196 owners and the average 
owner undivided interests in 14 tracts.”). See generally Alberto B. Lopez, A Re-
valuation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1307, 1351 (2010) (“An anticom-
mons develops when ownership becomes splintered into numerous shares . . . .”). 
15 See Money Lessons from “Downton Abbey,” Wall St. J., March 2-3, 2013, p. B1, B10. 
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male.16 The head of the family at any given time is responsible for 
conserving and, if possible, increasing the patrimony, while making 
provision for daughters and younger sons. No English aristocrat or 
landed gentleman would ever have thought of requiring the equal 
distribution of annual income among all his surviving descendants in 
each generation. True dynasts were focused on maintaining the sta-
tus of the family in perpetuity, not on the perpetual well-being of 
each and every family member. 
To maintain family status, income-producing assets must be pre-
served intact. When land was the primary source of income in the 
form of rent, that meant tying up title to real property. Now that 
wealth consists primarily of personal property and income takes the 
form of dividends and interest, the trust is as good a device as the 
fee tail for the purpose of asset preservation – better, actually, since 
a professional trustee is more likely to preserve capital than is an 
individual produced by the random draw of birth order. But merely 
preserving capital is not enough to satisfy the serious dynast. In or-
der to maintain the family’s influence and social standing, income 
must not be dissipated among too many takers, but concentrated in 
only a few representatives (or even in only one) in each generation. 
Although equal treatment of all descendants in each generation 
has been the norm for the last century or two,17 traditional dynasts 
were made of sterner stuff. The limitation of a life estate to the set-
tlor’s first-born child with successive life estates to that beneficiary’s 
first-born child and so forth, generation after generation (“to A for 
life, then to B for life, then to C for life . . .”), was the time-tested 
                                                                                                 
16 Primogeniture was part of the common law of inheritance, but great English 
landowners typically used sophisticated estate planning in the form of strict set-
tlements to limit the enjoyment of the estate to one taker in each generation. For 
a brief description of the strict settlement, see Orth, Fee Tail, 23 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. at 777. 
17 Within a few years of the Revolution, all American states had replaced primogeni-
ture with partible inheritance. See Carol Shammas et al., Inheritance in America: 
From Colonial Times to the Present 32-33 (1987). Primogeniture survived in England 
until 1926 and in Scotland until 1964. See David M. Walker, The Oxford Compan-
ion to Law 988-89 (1980). 
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way to preserve both the wealth and prominence of a family forev-
er. As with the aristocratic estate, an arrangement in favor of the 
first born does not exclude provision for other descendants. The 
incumbent, taking into account needs and available income (as well 
as the display of proper family pride), can provide support for sib-
lings and their progeny. 
In the days before significant income taxation, this could be ac-
complished by simply vesting the head of the family with all the in-
come from the estate to distribute as he saw fit. Today the most 
obvious device would be to allocate the bulk of the income to the 
present incumbent, while giving him a special noncumulative and 
exclusive power of appointment over the remaining amount, exer-
cisable in favor of other descendants of the settlor (and, perhaps, 
their spouses). An institutional trust protector (that is, a profession-
al manager empowered to supervise the administration of the trust) 
could be used to prevent abuse, and provision could be made to deal 
with the risk of the donee’s incompetence by age or disability. Of 
course, all beneficiaries should be protected from their own im-
providence by spendthrift provisions.18 In addition, the goals of pre-
serving the corpus in perpetuity and maintaining the standard of 
living of the present head of the family must be expressly declared 
to be material purposes of the trust, in order to protect it from 
premature termination on the demand of a then-living beneficiary.19 
A settlor who is reluctant to confer so much power on one rep-
resentative in each generation may consider more imaginative de-
vices. Distributions of the reserved income could be mandatory but 
limited to a finite number of the most nearly related descendants, 
preserving the affluence of at least certain members of each genera-
                                                                                                 
18 See Uniform Trust Code § 502 (2000) (defining a spendthrift clause as one that 
“restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary’s interest”). 
19 For the current, somewhat qualified, statement of the material purpose rule, see 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65(2) (2003) (Beneficiaries cannot compel ter-
mination or modification of a trust after the settlor’s death if it would be incon-
sistent with a material purpose, “except . . . with authorization of the court if it 
determines that the reason(s) for termination or modification outweigh the mate-
rial purpose.”). 
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tion. Minimum amounts (indexed for inflation) could be prescribed 
to guarantee that distributions would be sufficient to maintain the 
recipients at an appropriate level of economic and social standing. 
The Malthusian effect could be further countered by limiting the 
number of children of any one descendant who could receive a dis-
tribution, encouraging reproduction at or below the replacement 
rate. To address fears that the family standard-bearer might not con-
tinue to uphold the family honor (however defined), a self-renewing 
panel of trust protectors might be empowered periodically to re-
view the representative’s performance according to some ascertain-
able standard and allocate or re-allocate income accordingly.20 
!" 
or the present, the dynastic impulse has prevailed over the de-
mands of public policy. But history suggests that this victory, 
like all previous ones, is unlikely to be permanent. As ever, the 
gravest threat will come from changes in the law of property or re-
distributive taxation. If the past is any guide, the pendulum will 
eventually swing back in favor of restrictions. In the meantime, es-
tate planners should be prepared to propose creative ways to recon-
cile the dynastic impulse with demography. Professor Austin Scott, 
the doyen of trust lawyers, long ago reminded us that “[t]he purpos-
es for which we can create trusts are as unlimited as our imagina-
tion.”21 So, too, our imagination is the only limit on the terms of 
dynasty trusts tailored to maintain the dynast’s family at the top lev-




                                                                                                 
20 I am indebted to James P. Spica, Esq. for the suggestion that incentive trust 
devices be added to the “serious” dynasty trust. 
21 1 Austin Wakeman Scott, The Law of Trusts § 1, p. 4 (1939). 
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